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Epidemic Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Renal Dialysis Centers in Egypt

  1. Nasr M. El Sayed1,
  2. Peter John Gomatos2,a,
  3. Consuelo M. Beck-Sagué4,a,
  4. Ursula Dietrich5,
  5. Hagen von Briesen5,
  6. Saladin Osmanov6,
  7. José Esparza6,
  8. Ray R. Arthur2,7,
  9. Mohammed H. Wahdan3 and
  10. William R. Jarvis4
  1. 1National AIDS Programme, Ministry of Health and Population, Egypt
  2. 2Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3, Cairo, Egypt
  3. 3World Health Organization, Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office, Alexandria, Egypt
  4. 4Hospital Infections Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
  5. 5Georg-Speyer Haus, Frankfurt, Germany
  6. 6Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, Global Programme on AIDS, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland
  7. 7Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland
  1. Reprints or correspondence: Dr. Peter J. Gomatos, Broadway Health Center, 301 Broadway Ave., Riviera Beach, FL 33404.
  • a Present affiliations: Florida Department of Health (Palm Beach County), West Palm Beach, Florida (P.J.G.); Office of the Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta (C.M.B.-S.).

Abstract

In 1993 an epidemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection occurred among 39 patients at 2 renal dialysis centers in Egypt. The centers, private center A (PCA) and university center A (UCA) were visited, HIV-infected patients were interviewed, seroconver-sion rates at UCA were calculated, and relatedness of HIV strains was determined by sequence analysis; 34 (62%) of 55 patients from UCA and 5 (42%) of 12 patients from PCA were HIV-infected. The HIV seroconversion risk at UCA varied significantly with day and shift of dialysis session. Practices that resulted in sharing of syringes among patients were observed at both centers. The analyzed V3 loop sequences of the HIV strain of 12 outbreak patients were >96% related to each other. V3 loop sequences from each of 8 HIV-infected Egyptians unrelated to the 1993 epidemic were only 76%–89% related to those from outbreak strains. Dialysis patients may be at risk for HIV infection if infection control guidelines are not followed.

Renal dialysis has been considered to be a low-risk setting for transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection [1]. Nevertheless, at least 2 outbreaks of HIV infection in dialysis units have occurred within this decade: one in Egypt in 1990, in which a total of 82 HIV infections occurred at 3 renal dialysis centers [2], and a second in 1994 in Colombia, in which 12 dialysis patients tested positive for HIV [3, 4]. In these outbreaks, transmission appeared to be associated with common exposure to inadequately sterilized dialysis and/or patient care equipment and likely reuse of that equipment for different patients. However, in none of these outbreaks was transmission of the same HIV strain proven by molecular methods.

We report here the investigation of an outbreak of HIV infections that occurred in 1993 among patients attending 1 private dialysis center (PCA) and/or one university dialysis center (UCA) in the Gharbia governorate in Egypt. This outbreak was first recognized when 3 HIV-seropositive dialysis patients were found during routine periodic screening in the Gharbia governorate, which is not 1 of the 3 governorates involved in the 1990 outbreak described elsewhere [2].

Patients and Methods

Case definitions

An HIV seroconverter was a dialysis patient at UCA or PCA who was known to be HIV seronegative before having a test positive for HIV antibody between 1 May 1993 and 31 January 1994. An HIV-seropositive patient was a dialysis patient at UCA or PCA who had a positive result on HIV antibody testing between 1 May 1993 and 31 January 1994 and who did not have a previously documented serologic test negative for HIV.

Epidemiologic investigation

In routine periodic testing, several HIV seroconversions were identified during May 1993 at UCA. In collaboration with the World Health Organization, the US Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Egyptian Ministry of Health and Population conducted an investigation that included HIV serologic testing of all hemodialysis patients in Gharbia, visits to various dialysis centers in Gharbia (see below), interviews with the medical staff and surviving HIV-infected patients, and review of dialysis procedures and records, including observation of dialysis sessions. All surviving seropositive patients and seroconverters were interviewed in private by one of the authors (N.M.E.-S.) to determine risk factors for HIV by means of a standard questionnaire. This questionnaire had been in use in Egypt since 1987 as part of the Ministry of Health AIDS surveillance activities. Patient demographic, behavioral, and dialysis history data were collected and then entered and analyzed by use of Epi Info, v5 (Epidemiology Program Office, CDC, Atlanta) [5]. Seroconversion rates at UCA were compared by patient and dialysis session characteristics, and relative risks (RRs) were calculated [5]. Probabilities were obtained from χ2 or Fisher's exact two-tailed tests for categorical variables and from Kruskal-Wallis test for 2 groups (equivalent to Student's t test) for continuous variables [5].

Dialysis center visits

During June and November 1993, PCA, UCA, center B, and the Transplant Hospital dialysis centers in Gharbia were visited. The patients undergoing dialysis and the staff working in the centers in June 1993 were the same as those during January–May 1993. All staff working on each shift were interviewed by one of the authors (N.M.E.-S.) in June 1993. In November 1993, PCA, UCA, center B, and the Transplant Hospital dialysis center were visited, and another author (C.M.B.-S.) interviewed staff by means of a structured, open-ended questionnaire. Different patients were undergoing dialysis in November, but the staff was the same. At both visits, procedures for starting and ending dialysis sessions and flushing lines were observed. Control measures introduced in response to the outbreak were assessed in November 1993.

HIV antibody testing

All serum samples were tested for antibodies to HIV-1 and HIV-2 by ELISA with the recombinant HIV-1/HIV-2 second-generation kit from Abbott Diagnostics (Chicago). All positive results on ELISA were confirmed by Western blot testing (Diagnostic Biotechnology, Singapore).

Sequencing

To determine whether HIV strains infecting patients at PCA and UCA and 1 patient in another center in Gharbia, center B, were related, the sequences of strains infecting patients receiving dialysis only at UCA, only at PCA, and in center B were compared with each other and with those infecting Egyptian adults with risk factors other than dialysis [6]. Genomic DNA was extracted from each patient's peripheral blood mononuclear cells or from virus cocultures by use of the QIAamp Blood Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany). About 600 bp of the env gene containing the V3 region were amplified by nested polymerase chain reaction (PCR), as described elsewhere [7]. Biotinylated PCR products were purified magnetically by use of dynabeads (M280; Dynal, Lake Success, NY), according to the instructions of the manufacturer. Direct sequencing of the PCR fragments was done with the primer Hle7187r and fluoro-dATP (Boehringer Mannheim, Basel, Switzerland) as label. Sequences were evaluated on an A.L.F. automated sequencing device (Pharmacia, Stockholm).

Phylogenetic analysis

Nucleotide sequences were aligned by use of the program Microgenie (Beckman Coulter, Fullerton, CA). The resultant alignment was hand edited to align gaps to codon boundaries. Aligned sequences were used to generate a neighbor-joining phylogenetic tree with the software package TREECON 1.2 [8] and Kimura algorithm [9]. A total of 301 nucleotides were analyzed; 209 informative sites occurred in the total data set, including outgroups.

Control measures

Measures introduced to control HIV transmission in 1990, and revisions introduced in response to the 1993 epidemic, were reviewed.

Results

Epidemiologic investigation

A total of 39 HIV-seropositive patients were identified by mid-July 1993 in Gharbia. The 39 HIV-infected patients included 34 (61.8%) of 55 patients undergoing dialysis at UCA and 5 (41.6%) of 12 patients undergoing dialysis at PCA. Of the 34 HIV-infected persons undergoing dialysis at UCA, 21 (61.8%) were seroconverters and 13 were seropositive; of the 5 undergoing dialysis at PCA, 3 (60.0%) were seroconverters and 2 were seropositive.

One UCA dialysis patient died before any outbreak data had been collected, leaving for interview the 5 patients from PCA and 33 of 34 HIV-infected patients from UCA. The median age of these patients was 39 years (range, 18–71 years), and 23 (60.5%) were men. In confidential interviews, all 38 denied intravenous drug use, homosexual sex, extramarital sex, or travel to countries with high prevalence of HIV. All first positive HIV tests for these 38 persons were obtained between 1 May and 8 July 1993.

For the 21 seroconverters at UCA, prior negative HIV tests had been performed 21–416 days (median, 240 days) before the first positive test. The number of dialysis sessions ranged from 10 to 305 (mean, 93.9). Eleven of 33 patients with HIV infection had received dialysis previously at PCA. Data available for 10 of these 11 patients revealed that they had had dialysis previously at PCA 1–48 times (mean, 10.9). When seroconversion rates by dialysis day and shift were compared (by use of all patients who were ever seronegative for the denominator), patients who received dialysis on the Saturday/Tuesday schedule at UCA were more likely (12/15 [80%]) to seroconvert than were patients on the Sunday/Wednesday schedule (5/12 [42%]; RR, 1.92; P = .049) or the Monday/Thursday schedule (4/14 [28.6%]; RR, 2.8; P = .005). The rate of HIV seroconversion was higher among patients receiving dialysis on the first (10/14 [71%]) or second shift (8/15 [53%]) than among those receiving dialysis on the third (evening) shift (3/12 [25%]; RR, 2.5; P = .03). HIV seroconversion rates were similar among men and women (14/28 [50%] vs. 7/13 [54%]); P = .82).

Of 20 seroconverters who were known to have been transfused, 12 had a negative test for HIV antibody >30 days after the last transfusion. All but 1 transfusion occurred in Egypt. Some blood units were obtained from paid professional donors of private blood banks. Compared with HIV-seropositive patients, seroconverters at UCA were more likely to have had transfusions (20/21 [95%] vs. 8/12 [67%]; P = .05) or to have had >100 sessions at UCA (13/21 [62%] vs. 1/12 [8%]; P = .003). When controlled for number of sessions at UCA, prior transfusion was still associated with seroconversion, but this relationship was no longer statistically significant (P = .24).

Dialysis center visits

PCA, UCA, center B, and the transplant hospital dialysis center in Gharbia were visited twice during the investigation. They had all been operating for >2 years by May 1993. In 1993, guidelines produced by the Egyptian Ministry of Health in response to the 1990 dialysis-related HIV transmissions in Egypt were in effect. These guidelines recommended HIV screening of all new patients before initiation of dialysis in each center, and standard (universal) precautions to prevent transmission of bloodborne pathogens as outlined in Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines [10]. There was a transfer of patients, but not personnel, between the centers. PCA, UCA, and center B did not have needle or sharps containers, but the transplant hospital dialysis center did have these, as well as red waterproof bags for infectious waste (table 1).

Figure 1

Amino acid alignment of V3 region from outbreak (boxed, sequences 1–13) and nonoutbreak (sequences 14–21) sequences. V3 loop is in italics. Amino acids that are unique to outbreak sequences are shaded. Note uniformity among outbreak strain amino acid sequences and heterogeneity in this region among nonoutbreak sequences (GenBank accession nos. AF155706-AF155727).

Figure 2

Phylogenetic tree showing relatedness of outbreak (sequences 1–13) and nonoutbreak (sequences 14–21) sequences from V3 region (238 positions). Aligned sequences were used to generate neighbor-joining phylogenetic tree by means of software package TREE-CON 1.2 and Kimura algorithm. Tree is rooted on sequence of patient 13 (GenBank accession nos. AF155706-AF155727).

Table 1

Characteristics of dialysis centers visited in Egypt, June and November 1993.

PCA was located in a poorly maintained private apartment and had 5 dialysis machines (Cobe Century 2; Travenol Laboratories, Deerfield, IL). The total census of patients undergoing dialysis was 5, although there was capacity to dialyze 12–15 patients in 3 shifts. The dialysis staff had no formally trained nurses; training had been given by the medical director of PCA. On a single wheeled tray between 2 patients were unlabeled small (∼25 mL) plastic bottles that were periodically refilled from a larger container (∼1000 mL) said to contain sterile water. Heparin from break-top glass ampules was diluted by drawing up water from these small plastic bottles into unlabeled plastic disposable syringes on the single wheeled tray. As often as every hour, diluted heparinized saline from 1 of the 2 unmarked syringes was administered through the blood line port, and the unmarked syringe was returned to the wheeled tray. Staff members agreed that a single syringe may have been used for >1 patient. In addition, nurses reported that, often, a 10-mL syringe with heparinized saline was carried in their pockets for flushing lines as needed. The staff denied reuse of dia-lyzers (Althin, CD, Miami) or blood lines, and there was no place to reprocess or store reused items. The medical director stated that all patients were tested for HIV on admission to the PCA, and subsequently every 3 months, even though there were no available documents at PCA.

UCA was located within the University Hospital, and its medical director was the same as the medical director of PCA. UCA operated 3 shifts of 6–7 patients who received dialysis twice a week. The UCA staff consisted of professionally trained licensed nurses, 3 of whom worked in each shift. There were 6 dialysis machines. Saline for priming the dialyzers and for dilution of heparin was taken from a sterile normal saline solution bottle dedicated for use for a particular patient. Heparinized saline was kept in 10-mL syringes for boluses for an individual patient on top of the dialysis machine to which the patient was connected. After each use, the CF Baxter dialyzers (Travenol) and tubing were discarded. Reuse was denied, and there were no facilities to reprocess or store used materials.

The UCA staff indicated that before the HIV outbreak was recognized, the same syringe was used to flush the lines of >1 patient. Heparin was diluted with sterile saline in 10-mL syringes prior to or during dialysis sessions. Prefilled heparinized saline syringes were refrigerated overnight. During the dialysis session, they were carried by nurses in their pockets or placed unlabeled on a wheeled tray shared by all shift patients. It is possible that they were used for >1 shift or refrigerated after use.

Center B had 3 machines (2 Cobe [GAMBRO Healthcare, Lakewood, CO] and 1 Fresenius [Fresnius, Bad Homburg, Germany]), and only 1 patient was receiving dialysis during the November visit. Before July 1993, 2 shifts of 2 patients each, 6 days a week, received dialysis in this facility; there was only 1 tray, and flushing with shared syringes may have occurred. The transplant hospital dialysis center had 12 Gambro dialysis machines (GAMBRO Healthcare) and used Baxter 15 hollow-fiber dialyzers (Baxter, Deerfield, IL). There was a separate room for 2 other dialysis machines and 1 nurse dedicated only to hepatitis B surface antigen-positive patients. There were no facilities for reprocessing of dialyzers; reuse was denied. No practices that could result in inadvertent or intentional use of syringes or needles for >1 patient were observed in this center. Used dialyzers and tubing were discarded in infectious waste bags. A syringe of heparinized saline was prepared for each patient at the beginning of the session, labeled, kept on the dialysis machine, and discarded at the end of the session in a rigid puncture-resistant container. There were no patients with HIV infection among the 75 who received dialysis in 3 shifts twice a week at the transplant hospital dialysis center.

Laboratory investigations

Strains related to the outbreak were sequenced; these strains were obtained from 1 dialysis patient whose peripheral blood mononuclear cells had been stored at −130°C since 1994 and from 12 dialysis patients from the 1993 outbreak who were alive in 1995 and 1996 and agreed to donate blood. Two samples were from the same patient (patient 5) obtained at different times, in March and December 1996. In all, 14 samples from 13 patients were available related to the outbreak: 7 patients were HIV seroconverters and 6 were HIV-seropositive patients without prior negative serologic tests (table 2). For comparison, samples from 8 Egyptians whose HIV infection was not related to the 1993 dialysis outbreak (table 3) were sequenced.

Table 2

Dialysis history and dates of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) antibody testing for patients undergoing renal dialysis at 3 dialysis centers in Gharbia, Egypt, and whose strains were analyzed genetically.

Table 3

Characteristics of human immunodeficiency virus-positive Egyptian patients not associated with 1993 renal dialysis outbreak whose strains were analyzed genetically.

Of the 14 samples from 13 patients whose samples were related to the outbreak, 7 were from patients who received dialysis only at UCA, and 5 (including the 2 samples from patient 5) were from patients who received dialysis only at PCA (table 2). Another sample was from patient 10, who started dialysis at UCA in February 1992, was transferred to center B early in January 1993, and was confirmed to be HIV seropositive in October 1993. One sample was from patient 8, who never received dialysis at PCA or UCA but did receive dialysis at center B in Gharbia, where patient 10 was undergoing dialysis (table 2). Patient 8, who was transferred to center B in May 1993, was confirmed to be an HIV seroconverter in October 1993.

All outbreak sequences belonged to HIV-1, subtype B. Within the nonoutbreak sequences, 1 strain was subtype E (patient 14), and 2 strains (patients 16 and 19) had quite divergent B sequences with an APGR amino acid motif at the tip of the V3 loop. The nucleotide homology between the outbreak strain sequences was significantly higher (⩾96%) than between sequences of strains unrelated to the outbreak (76%–89%). Alignment of the V3 regions of outbreak and nonoutbreak strain sequences showed that outbreak strain sequences varied much less than did nonoutbreak sequences (figure 1). Two amino acids at positions 6 and 10 after the C-terminal cysteine of the V3 loop (figure 1, shaded Q and A) were unique for the outbreak sequences. A third amino acid at position 14 after the C-terminal cysteine also was unique for the outbreak sequences, except for one nonoutbreak sequence from patient 20.

Two sequences derived from patient 5 from samples obtained 9 months apart in 1996 were included in the phylogenetic analysis. The 2 intraindividual sequences were interspersed in the phylogenetic tree with sequences derived from different dialysis patients, reflecting the clonal relationship of interpatient HIV sequences (figure 2). The homology was remarkable, because the outbreak strains available for analysis for 7 of 12 patients were from blood samples collected in 1996, as much as 3 years after the outbreak. Enough time would have elapsed to promote divergence and development of quasispecies in infecting HIV of each of these patients.

Although patient 8 had never undergone dialysis at UCA or PCA, the HIV strain isolated from patient 8 was closely related to the outbreak strain. This finding suggested that the source of HIV infection for patient 8, who seroconverted in October 1993 while undergoing dialysis at center B, may have been patient 10, who had been transferred from UCA to center B in January 1993.

Control measures

The unexpected finding in early May 1993 of 3 HIV-seropositive dialysis patients during routine periodic screening prompted HIV screening of all dialysis patients in Gharbia. In July 1993, PCA was closed. All HIV-infected patients receiving dialysis at PCA and UCA were transferred to another center designated by the Ministry of Health. The shifts at UCA were reduced from 3 to 1, with 5 HIV-seroneg-ative patients receiving dialysis twice a week. PCA reopened again in October 1993 to dialyze 5 HIV-seronegative patients twice a week in 1 shift. A survey and educational programs in dialysis centers were conducted to emphasize compliance with national guidelines in centers in Gharbia.

Discussion

Dialysis adhering to conventional infection control measures has been considered a low-risk setting for transmission of HIV [1]. Even in centers with a high prevalence of HIV infection, no evidence of HIV transmission has been seen. The only reports of HIV transmission in dialysis units were associated with apparent reuse of dialysis needle access devices, in which these devices were used for >1 patient and/or were disinfected inadequately in a common container [24]. In this investigation, we documented HIV seroconversion in the absence of dialyzer reuse and patient HIV risk factors.

Because of the remarkable nucleotide sequence homology of the outbreak strains analyzed, with interpatient variability being comparable to intrapatient variability [11, 12], and because no patient was transferred from UCA to PCA, it would appear that HIV infection was introduced into PCA and later into UCA from a common source late in 1992 or early in 1993. It is unclear why patients who received dialysis in the first or second shift had a significantly higher seroconversion risk than did those in the third (evening) shift. This difference in risk may have been due to the somewhat higher patient-to-nurse ratio for the first and second shifts (5:1) than for the evening shift (4:1) The 1 fewer patient per nurse on the evening shift may have reduced the number of patients among whom a syringe would be shared, the workload for each nurse, or other factors related to transmission. Transmission of HIV among patients probably occurred quickly within the next few months, with most transmissions occurring before July 1993. Transmission probably resulted from practices leading to use of syringes for >1 patient. The fact that seroconversion risk varied significantly by dialysis shift and day, and not by patient characteristics, supports the possibility that HIV transmission was related to practices in the dialysis centers. The practice of flushing lines during hemodialysis with a syringe and needle that has been previously used to flush other patients' lines could expose subsequent patients to bloodborne pathogens if the patient whose line was previously flushed was infected. Practices that would lead to use of a syringe for >1 patient were observed during visits to PCA and UCA and were observed during the November 1993 visit at PCA, with the medical director in attendance, even after recognition of the outbreak. The fact that the patients receiving dialysis in November 1993 had recent negative HIV antibody test results may have served to reassure staff that the risk of HIV transmission was minimal and that previous practices could be reinstituted.

Our study has the following limitations. By November 1993, when the epidemiologic studies were conducted, UCA had only HIV-seronegative patients. Similarly, PCA had been closed for several months and only recently had reopened for dialysis of HIV-seronegative patients only. No stored heparinized saline from the time of the outbreak remained for analysis. Although it has been suggested that HIV is stable and can retain some infectiousness in suspension [1315], no studies specifically addressing the issue of viability of HIV in heparinized saline have been published. However, recently infected patients often have high virus loads, which may increase the likelihood of transmission to other patients. It is unclear which patient was the first to be infected with HIV, or how, but transfusion from an HIV-infected blood donor is likely.

Subsequent to this investigation, more patients epidemiol-ogically linked to this outbreak were found to have HIV infection, bringing the total number of patients identified as infected to 64. In 1993, patients related to this outbreak represented 17% of all HIV-infected Egyptians identified since 1985 (unpublished data); as of 1998, 32% of all HIV-infected Egyptians were infected during dialysis, suggesting that dialysis is a high-risk setting for HIV transmission in Egypt.

Throughout the world, unrecognized HIV transmission may be occurring in dialysis centers that have not implemented effective methods of prevention of transmission of bloodborne pathogens [10]. The outbreak described in this investigation was recognized because the Egyptian Ministry of Health had instituted a policy after the 1990 dialysis HIV outbreak recommending periodic HIV testing of patients receiving long-term dialysis [2]. If the policy had been followed more strictly, the epidemic may have been recognized, and possibly contained, earlier in its course.

Dialysis staff should become conversant with practices related to the prevention of HIV transmission in dialysis units [10]. Centers should adhere to standard precautions during all sessions for all patients, and procedures that expose patients to other patients' blood, such as those observed in this investigation, should not be permitted [4, 10]. Identification of any suspected HIV seroconversion should prompt an investigation at the center to attempt to identify whether transmission was associated with dialysis and, if so, how it occurred. Centers not complying with effective measures to prevent transmission of bloodborne pathogens should be closed and not allowed to reopen until compliance can be ensured by on-site inspection. HIV serologic testing of all new patients beginning long-term dialysis and periodic retesting in countries where HIV transmission has been a problem may hasten the recognition of HIV transmission. However, negative results of HIV antibody tests should not be used to justify practices that promote the transmission of bloodborne pathogens.

Transfusion of blood products remains necessary to treat the anemia of chronic renal disease. The most likely source of entry of HIV into dialysis centers may be blood products. All donated blood should be screened as recommended for >10 years [16]. Given the high prevalence of hepatitis B and C, screening of blood for these pathogens [17] and adherence to infection control guidelines is vital to reduce the transmission of bloodborne pathogens worldwide.

Acknowledgments

We thank Magdi Darwish, Margot Landersz, and Lisa Kurunci for expert technical assistance.

Footnotes

  • Guidelines of the US Department of Health and Human Services, US Department of Defense, and the Ministry of Health, Egypt, governing the protection of human subjects during epidemic investigations were followed in the conduct of this epidemic investigation.

  • Use of trade names is for identification only, and does not imply endorsement by the Egyptian Ministry of Health, WHO, Global Programme on AIDS, US Department of Health and Human Services, or US Department of Defense.

  • Financial support: Naval Medical Research and Development Command, Bethesda, Maryland; Georg-Speyer Haus is supported by the Bundesministerium fur Gesundheit and the Hessisches Ministerium fur Wissenschaft und Kunst.

  • Received February 16, 1999.
  • Revision received July 23, 1999.

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